As far as cooking is concerned, some things which are strictly fruits, such as tomatoes or bean pods, may be called 'vegetables' because they are used in savory rather than sweet cooking.
While it is botanically a fruit, it is considered a vegetable for culinary purposes (as well as under U.S. customs regulations, see Nix v. Hedden), which has caused some confusion. The fruit is rich in lycopene, which may have beneficial health effects.
The tomato is the edible, often red fruit/berry of the nightshade Solanum lycopersicum, commonly known as a tomato plant. The species originated in the South American Andes and its use as a
The tomato is consumed in diverse ways, including raw, as an ingredient in many dishes, sauces, salads, and drinks.
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When The Supreme Court Decided Tomatoes Were Vegetables; hmmmm?
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did, indeed, answer that question in 1893’s Nix v. Hedden, decided 120 years ago today.
You are probably wondering what led to the Court’s deciding such a question. The law at issue in Nix is the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, which imposed atax on imported vegetables of 10% ad valorem (of its value). This tax didn’t apply to fruits.
The importers, John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and Frank W. Nix, brought suit against the port collector to recover the duties paid for their imported tomatoes, arguing that since tomatoes are, botanically speaking, a fruit, the tariff didn’t apply.
At trial, both parties read the definitions of “fruit,” “vegetable,” “tomato,” and several other fruits and vegetables from Webster’s, Worcester’s, and the Imperial Dictionaries. One witness also testified that the terms “fruit” and “vegetable” hadn’t acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce distinct from those definitions read from the dictionaries.
The trial court granted the port collector’s motion for a directed verdict, and the Nixes appealed.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. However, the Court didn’t look at the dictionary definitions read at trial since, according to the Court, “dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.”
Thus, the Court only looked at the “ordinary meaning” – that is, “the common language of the people” – since the evidence at trial established that the words “fruit” and “vegetable” have not “acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce.”
Although the Court conceded that, “[b]otanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine,” it further held that the common conception of the produce is as a vegetable.
The Court made the same distinction with “cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas” (none of which are vegetables, botanically speaking).
In explaining its decision, the Court stated that the tomato is a vegetable since it is served as part of the main course of a meal, “and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.”
If you can believe it, the Court actually had directly relevant precedent to rely on in making this decision: Robertson v. Salomon, decided four years earlier.
Salomon, like Nix, dealt with the definition of “vegetable” under the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883. Instead of deducing the identity of the tomato, Salomon resolved the question of whether white beans were “seeds” (and exempt from taxation under the tariff) or “vegetables.”
Although the bean is botanically a seed, the Court reached the same conclusion as it later did in Nix: that the common conception of beans is as a vegetable, since they are most often produced as food, not as seeds to be planted.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court ruled in either case, a tomato is still a fruit and a bean is still a seed.
But as a testament to the great power wielded by the high court, even when the Court is unequivocally wrong in a decision, it’s still correct.
And this maxim isn’t any less true today than it was 120 years ago.
- See more at: http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-1893-the-supreme-court-rules-that-tomatoes-are-vegetables-not-fruits/#sthash.yUxSn9KI.dpuf
This feels ridiculous and legalistic in the way that a lot of You are probably wondering what led to the Court’s deciding such a question. The law at issue in Nix is the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, which imposed a
The importers, John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and Frank W. Nix, brought suit against the port collector to recover the duties paid for their imported tomatoes, arguing that since tomatoes are, botanically speaking, a fruit, the tariff didn’t apply.
At trial, both parties read the definitions of “fruit,” “vegetable,” “tomato,” and several other fruits and vegetables from Webster’s, Worcester’s, and the Imperial Dictionaries. One witness also testified that the terms “fruit” and “vegetable” hadn’t acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce distinct from those definitions read from the dictionaries.
The trial court granted the port collector’s motion for a directed verdict, and the Nixes appealed.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. However, the Court didn’t look at the dictionary definitions read at trial since, according to the Court, “dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.”
Thus, the Court only looked at the “ordinary meaning” – that is, “the common language of the people” – since the evidence at trial established that the words “fruit” and “vegetable” have not “acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce.”
Although the Court conceded that, “[b]otanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine,” it further held that the common conception of the produce is as a vegetable.
The Court made the same distinction with “cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas” (none of which are vegetables, botanically speaking).
In explaining its decision, the Court stated that the tomato is a vegetable since it is served as part of the main course of a meal, “and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.”
If you can believe it, the Court actually had directly relevant precedent to rely on in making this decision: Robertson v. Salomon, decided four years earlier.
Salomon, like Nix, dealt with the definition of “vegetable” under the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883. Instead of deducing the identity of the tomato, Salomon resolved the question of whether white beans were “seeds” (and exempt from taxation under the tariff) or “vegetables.”
Although the bean is botanically a seed, the Court reached the same conclusion as it later did in Nix: that the common conception of beans is as a vegetable, since they are most often produced as food, not as seeds to be planted.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court ruled in either case, a tomato is still a fruit and a bean is still a seed.
But as a testament to the great power wielded by the high court, even when the Court is unequivocally wrong in a decision, it’s still correct.
And this maxim isn’t any less true today than it was 120 years ago.
- See more at: http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-1893-the-supreme-court-rules-that-tomatoes-are-vegetables-not-fruits/#sthash.yUxSn9KI.dpuf
Are tomatoes fruits or vegetables?
Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that, under U.S. customs regulations, the tomato should be classified as a vegetable rather than a fruit. The Court's unanimous opinion held that the Tariff Act of 1883 used the ordinary meaning of the words "fruit" and "vegetable," instead of the technical botanical meaning.
Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court did, indeed, answer that question in 1893’s Nix v.
Hedden, decided 120 years ago today. - See more at:
http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-1893-the-supreme-court-rules-that-tomatoes-are-vegetables-not-fruits/#sthash.yUxSn9KI.dpuf
You are probably wondering what led to the Court’s deciding such a question. The law at issue in Nix is the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, which imposed a tax on imported vegetables of 10% ad valorem (of its value). This tax didn’t apply
to fruits. - See more at:
http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-1893-the-supreme-court-rules-that-tomatoes-are-vegetables-not-fruits/#sthash.yUxSn9KI.dpuf
The Tariff Act of March 3, 1883
required a tax to be paid on imported vegetables, but not fruit. The
case was filed as an action by John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and
Frank W. Nix against Edward L. Hedden, Collector of the Port of New York, to recover back duties paid under protest. Botanically, a tomato is a fruit because it is a seed-bearing structure growing from the At the trial, the plaintiffs' counsel, after reading in evidence definitions of the words 'fruit' and 'vegetables' from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary, and the Imperial Dictionary, called two witnesses, who had been in the business of selling fruit and vegetables for 30 years, and asked them, after hearing these definitions, to say whether these words had "any
- "[the dictionary] does not classify all things there, but they are
correct as far as they go. It does not take all kinds of fruit or
vegetables; it takes a portion of them. I think the words 'fruit' and
'vegetable' have the same meaning in
trade today that they had on March 1, 1883. I understand that the term 'fruit' is applied in trade only to such plants or parts of plants as contain the seeds. There are more vegetables than those in the enumeration given in Webster's Dictionary under the term 'vegetable,' as 'cabbage, cauliflower, turnips, potatoes, peas, beans, and the like,' probably covered by the words 'and the like.'"
Both the plaintiffs' counsel and the defendant's counsel made use of the dictionaries. The plaintiffs' counsel read in evidence from the same dictionaries the definitions of the word tomato, while the defendant's counsel then read in evidence from Webster's Dictionary the definitions of the words pea, eggplant, cucumber, squash, and pepper. Countering this, the plaintiff then read in evidence from Webster's and Worcester's dictionaries the definitions of potato, turnip, parsnip, cauliflower, cabbage, carrot and bean.
The court unanimously decided in favor of the defense and found that the tomato should be classified under the customs regulations as a vegetable, based on the ways in which it is used, and the popular perception to this end.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did, indeed, answer that question in 1893’s Nix v. Hedden, decided 120 years ago today.
You are probably wondering what led to the Court’s deciding such a question. The law at issue in Nix is the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, which imposed atax on imported vegetables of 10% ad valorem (of its value). This tax didn’t apply to fruits.
The importers, John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and Frank W. Nix, brought suit against the port collector to recover the duties paid for their imported tomatoes, arguing that since tomatoes are, botanically speaking, a fruit, the tariff didn’t apply.
At trial, both parties read the definitions of “fruit,” “vegetable,” “tomato,” and several other fruits and vegetables from Webster’s, Worcester’s, and the Imperial Dictionaries. One witness also testified that the terms “fruit” and “vegetable” hadn’t acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce distinct from those definitions read from the dictionaries.
The trial court granted the port collector’s motion for a directed verdict, and the Nixes appealed.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. However, the Court didn’t look at the dictionary definitions read at trial since, according to the Court, “dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.”
Thus, the Court only looked at the “ordinary meaning” – that is, “the common language of the people” – since the evidence at trial established that the words “fruit” and “vegetable” have not “acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce.”
Although the Court conceded that, “[b]otanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine,” it further held that the common conception of the produce is as a vegetable.
The Court made the same distinction with “cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas” (none of which are vegetables, botanically speaking).
In explaining its decision, the Court stated that the tomato is a vegetable since it is served as part of the main course of a meal, “and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.”
If you can believe it, the Court actually had directly relevant precedent to rely on in making this decision: Robertson v. Salomon, decided four years earlier.
Salomon, like Nix, dealt with the definition of “vegetable” under the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883. Instead of deducing the identity of the tomato, Salomon resolved the question of whether white beans were “seeds” (and exempt from taxation under the tariff) or “vegetables.”
Although the bean is botanically a seed, the Court reached the same conclusion as it later did in Nix: that the common conception of beans is as a vegetable, since they are most often produced as food, not as seeds to be planted.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court ruled in either case, a tomato is still a fruit and a bean is still a seed.
But as a testament to the great power wielded by the high court, even when the Court is unequivocally wrong in a decision, it’s still correct.
And this maxim isn’t any less true today than it was 120 years ago.
- See more at: http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-1893-the-supreme-court-rules-that-tomatoes-are-vegetables-not-fruits/#sthash.yUxSn9KI.dpuf
You are probably wondering what led to the Court’s deciding such a question. The law at issue in Nix is the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, which imposed a
The importers, John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and Frank W. Nix, brought suit against the port collector to recover the duties paid for their imported tomatoes, arguing that since tomatoes are, botanically speaking, a fruit, the tariff didn’t apply.
At trial, both parties read the definitions of “fruit,” “vegetable,” “tomato,” and several other fruits and vegetables from Webster’s, Worcester’s, and the Imperial Dictionaries. One witness also testified that the terms “fruit” and “vegetable” hadn’t acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce distinct from those definitions read from the dictionaries.
The trial court granted the port collector’s motion for a directed verdict, and the Nixes appealed.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. However, the Court didn’t look at the dictionary definitions read at trial since, according to the Court, “dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.”
Thus, the Court only looked at the “ordinary meaning” – that is, “the common language of the people” – since the evidence at trial established that the words “fruit” and “vegetable” have not “acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce.”
Although the Court conceded that, “[b]otanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine,” it further held that the common conception of the produce is as a vegetable.
The Court made the same distinction with “cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas” (none of which are vegetables, botanically speaking).
In explaining its decision, the Court stated that the tomato is a vegetable since it is served as part of the main course of a meal, “and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.”
If you can believe it, the Court actually had directly relevant precedent to rely on in making this decision: Robertson v. Salomon, decided four years earlier.
Salomon, like Nix, dealt with the definition of “vegetable” under the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883. Instead of deducing the identity of the tomato, Salomon resolved the question of whether white beans were “seeds” (and exempt from taxation under the tariff) or “vegetables.”
Although the bean is botanically a seed, the Court reached the same conclusion as it later did in Nix: that the common conception of beans is as a vegetable, since they are most often produced as food, not as seeds to be planted.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court ruled in either case, a tomato is still a fruit and a bean is still a seed.
But as a testament to the great power wielded by the high court, even when the Court is unequivocally wrong in a decision, it’s still correct.
And this maxim isn’t any less true today than it was 120 years ago.
- See more at: http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-1893-the-supreme-court-rules-that-tomatoes-are-vegetables-not-fruits/#sthash.yUxSn9KI.dpuf
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did, indeed, answer that question in 1893’s Nix v. Hedden, decided 120 years ago today.
You are probably wondering what led to the Court’s deciding such a question. The law at issue in Nix is the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, which imposed atax on imported vegetables of 10% ad valorem (of its value). This tax didn’t apply to fruits.
The importers, John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and Frank W. Nix, brought suit against the port collector to recover the duties paid for their imported tomatoes, arguing that since tomatoes are, botanically speaking, a fruit, the tariff didn’t apply.
At trial, both parties read the definitions of “fruit,” “vegetable,” “tomato,” and several other fruits and vegetables from Webster’s, Worcester’s, and the Imperial Dictionaries. One witness also testified that the terms “fruit” and “vegetable” hadn’t acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce distinct from those definitions read from the dictionaries.
The trial court granted the port collector’s motion for a directed verdict, and the Nixes appealed.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. However, the Court didn’t look at the dictionary definitions read at trial since, according to the Court, “dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.”
Thus, the Court only looked at the “ordinary meaning” – that is, “the common language of the people” – since the evidence at trial established that the words “fruit” and “vegetable” have not “acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce.”
Although the Court conceded that, “[b]otanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine,” it further held that the common conception of the produce is as a vegetable.
The Court made the same distinction with “cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas” (none of which are vegetables, botanically speaking).
In explaining its decision, the Court stated that the tomato is a vegetable since it is served as part of the main course of a meal, “and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.”
If you can believe it, the Court actually had directly relevant precedent to rely on in making this decision: Robertson v. Salomon, decided four years earlier.
Salomon, like Nix, dealt with the definition of “vegetable” under the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883. Instead of deducing the identity of the tomato, Salomon resolved the question of whether white beans were “seeds” (and exempt from taxation under the tariff) or “vegetables.”
Although the bean is botanically a seed, the Court reached the same conclusion as it later did in Nix: that the common conception of beans is as a vegetable, since they are most often produced as food, not as seeds to be planted.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court ruled in either case, a tomato is still a fruit and a bean is still a seed.
But as a testament to the great power wielded by the high court, even when the Court is unequivocally wrong in a decision, it’s still correct.
And this maxim isn’t any less true today than it was 120 years ago.
- See more at: http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-1893-the-supreme-court-rules-that-tomatoes-are-vegetables-not-fruits/#sthash.yUxSn9KI.dpuf
You are probably wondering what led to the Court’s deciding such a question. The law at issue in Nix is the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, which imposed a
The importers, John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and Frank W. Nix, brought suit against the port collector to recover the duties paid for their imported tomatoes, arguing that since tomatoes are, botanically speaking, a fruit, the tariff didn’t apply.
At trial, both parties read the definitions of “fruit,” “vegetable,” “tomato,” and several other fruits and vegetables from Webster’s, Worcester’s, and the Imperial Dictionaries. One witness also testified that the terms “fruit” and “vegetable” hadn’t acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce distinct from those definitions read from the dictionaries.
The trial court granted the port collector’s motion for a directed verdict, and the Nixes appealed.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. However, the Court didn’t look at the dictionary definitions read at trial since, according to the Court, “dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.”
Thus, the Court only looked at the “ordinary meaning” – that is, “the common language of the people” – since the evidence at trial established that the words “fruit” and “vegetable” have not “acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce.”
Although the Court conceded that, “[b]otanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine,” it further held that the common conception of the produce is as a vegetable.
The Court made the same distinction with “cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas” (none of which are vegetables, botanically speaking).
In explaining its decision, the Court stated that the tomato is a vegetable since it is served as part of the main course of a meal, “and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.”
If you can believe it, the Court actually had directly relevant precedent to rely on in making this decision: Robertson v. Salomon, decided four years earlier.
Salomon, like Nix, dealt with the definition of “vegetable” under the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883. Instead of deducing the identity of the tomato, Salomon resolved the question of whether white beans were “seeds” (and exempt from taxation under the tariff) or “vegetables.”
Although the bean is botanically a seed, the Court reached the same conclusion as it later did in Nix: that the common conception of beans is as a vegetable, since they are most often produced as food, not as seeds to be planted.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court ruled in either case, a tomato is still a fruit and a bean is still a seed.
But as a testament to the great power wielded by the high court, even when the Court is unequivocally wrong in a decision, it’s still correct.
And this maxim isn’t any less true today than it was 120 years ago.
- See more at: http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-1893-the-supreme-court-rules-that-tomatoes-are-vegetables-not-fruits/#sthash.yUxSn9KI.dpuf
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